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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
i l\10:-\ PACJFIC RAILROAD
('IJMPANY, a corporation,

-vs.STXJ'J~

l-T"\H,

Plaintiff,

No.10710

TAX COl\fl\lISSION OF
Defendant

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
:-ITA'rKl\lENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
'l'his proceeding involves the review of a majority
Lle~isiou of the State Tax Commission upholding a deficiency use tax assessment against plaintiff in the sum
of $888.42, and is concerned with the question of whethPr or not the railroad industry in Utah is "commercial"
in nature within the scope of Section 59-15-4, UCA, 1953,
as amended, which imposes the tax on ''gas, electricity,
hPat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished for
rlumt·stic or commercial consumption.''
Dl8PO~ITION BEFORE UTAH STATE TAX

COMMIS.SION
Following formal hearing, the State Tax Commission
18
' UPd a Decision, one Commissioner dissenting, upholding- the deficiency assessment.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the majority ruling of tht
defendant and judgment in its favor as a matter of la 11 .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no dispute between the parties as to the ma
terial facts of this ease. They were the subject of a 1n;1
ten stipulation introduced at the formal hearing, allii
show the following:
Section 59-15-4 (a) UCA, 1953, as amended, impose;
a sales tax upon retail sales of tangible personal proper~.
but specifically exempts all sales of "coal, fuel oil and
other fuels" except as provided in subsection (b). Thii! 1
subsection imposes a sales tax on "gas, electricity, heat.
coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished for domesfr
or commercial consumption." (R. 22, 23)
The foregoing provisions of the sales tax act mean
that all noncommercial sales and consumption of enerr·
or fuel in the State of Utah are exempt from the sale>
tax, and pursuant to the holding of this court in U11i' 1•
Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commis~ion.
110 Utah 152, 1'76 P. 2d 879 (1947), froru the use ta.\' 31
well. (R. 22)
During all times mentioned herein Union Pacifi
Railroad Company has been aud is a Utah corporati 111
engaged as a common carrier by railroad of freight an'
passengers for hire in intrastate commerce within Ftai;
as well as in interstate commerce in lTtah and surronnn
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The predominant character and nature
nl' its business is the ownership, operation and main!f'nanel' of a public service transportation system by rail
in 1rhieh all or substantially all of its operating property
is (kvoted to the transportation of property and persons
un>r lirn·s and terminals having fixed locations. Almost
nll of Union Pacific's functions are incidental to and in
t!if' iwrfonnance of said transportation business. (R. 10)
iiig ~latl:'8. (R 7)

ln !:laid transportation business Union Pacific pur,Jias<'~, stores, ust>s and/or consumes large amounts and
quantities of energ>· and fuel. Of these, the most important for railroad purposes is locomotive fuel oil which
i~ used for the propulsion of Union Pacific's locomotives.
In this regard neither Union Pacific nor the railroad
induHtr)· gent>rally operating in Utah has ever paid sales

and use taxes on purchases of locomotive fuel oil used
fnr thP propulsion of locomotive engines since the legislahm0 Pxempted from the sales tax all sales of coal, fuel
oil and other fuels furnished for other than domestic or
commercial consumption on March 18, 1943. Such con011111ption h~· the railroad industry has always been
crm;;idered by it to bt> noncommercial and therefore exf'H1pt. Tlw State Tax Commission has been in complete
ag-r0PmPnt with that position since it issued a formal
ruling to that effect on November 7, 1945, and has contimwrl. to exempt such consumption until July 1, 1965.
(H, 10, 21, 23)
'rli<• ehange and reversal of position by defendant
i··a" dnP to an Opinion of the Utah Attorney General,
Xii, fiii-!l:~8, whieh provides as follows:
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"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEKEl:LIL
"STATE OF UTAH
"OPINION OF LAW
No. 65-038
"Requested by Donald T. Adams, Chairman, LM
State Tax Commission. Opinion by Attorney Gr'li
eral Phil L. Hansen and staff.
"QUESTION
"Are sales within the State of Utah of ga;,
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fu1J,
to railroads subject to the Utah sales tax:
"CONCLUSION
"Yes.
OPINION
"Section 59-15---1, Utah Code Annotated,
provides in part:

HJj:'.,

"'From and after the effective date of tl1i·
act there is levied and there shall he eollP 11
ed and paid:

" '*

>/(:.

*

" '(b) A tax equivalent to two and orn·-linl'
per cent of the amount paid.

" '* * *
" ' ( 2) To any person as defined in ~]Ji,; :
including municipal corporations for, ~
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil or other fw·
1
sold or furnished for domestic or co1rn 11P
cial consumption ... '
1
'
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"'l'his section has been interpreted as taxing
'coal . . . furnished for domestic or commercial
commmption' but not coal furnished for' industrial
<·onsurni;tion.' (Union Portland Cement Co. v.
State Tax Cormnission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d
Hi-!, modified on rehearing 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d
879, (19+7 ).)
"''l his opinion was requested as to whether
sak of coal, etc., to railroads is subject to the sales
1

tax.

''ln view of the foregoing statute and interpretation, the narrower questien seems to be
whether or not the sale of coal, etc., to railroads
is in the nature of a sale for commercial consumption or in the nature of a sale for industrial conlimnption '? If commer·cial, it is apparently tax;1 hle; ir industrial, it is apparently not.
'"l'he cases which are concerned with defining
·01m1wrcial' and 'industrial' are not easily synthesi11Pd, since they arise under widely varying fact
situations and statutorv schemes. (Reiser v.
Meyer, 323 S.W. 2d 514,.Mo., 1959.) However, a
111<"aningful distinction has been made in some
l'<lSl'8 which say that fuel 'rnuld be used commer('iall)' when used merely to assist in the exchange
(Jf goods and services. (United Sta.tes v. Public
Sc1Tice C'o. of Colorad-o, 143 F.2d 79, 10th Cir.,
19-t+; Reiser v. Meyer, supra; Jordan v. Tashiro,
~IS tr.s. 123, 1928) and industrially when used to
rnannfacture or fabricate materials. (North Whittier Hei,r;hts C. Ass'n v. National Labor Relations
floord, 109 F.2d 76, 1940; Mitrdock v. City of
Xorf711N1od, 67 N.E. 2d 867, 870, Ohio, 1946.)
'

1

"ThP law in Utah pertaining to this question
shonld he explained by looking at both of these
<l<'finitions and at what appears to be the justification for making any distinction at all between
industrial and commercial uses.

6

"The rationale in not taxing sales of coal 1.:.1
for industrial purposes seems to be that th(: ,.;, , 1
of such materials is included in the price or u
article manufactured or fabricated, which artitJ,
is eventually taxed.
11

''Sales of coal for commercial consumptir11 ,
are taxed because the cost of the coal is not a,
closely connected with the product upon whi('li
there is an ultimate tax, or the use to which th"
coal is put results in a product or service upon
which there is no tax. Therefore, if a tax on sur·i1
sales is to be collected at all, it must be collec!i:il
at the time the coal is sold to the commercial user.
"This interpretation is in accord with tl11
holding in the Union Portland Cement case, su1Ji'a.
That case dealt with purchase of coal in Wyomin,
to be used for heating kilns used in the manufac
ture of cement in Utah. The case indicated that
the production of cement was an industrial acti
vity. The Court stated that while the coal did not
enter into and become an ingredient or component
part of the manufactured product so as to lwcorn
exempt as a wholesale sale under Section 59-1:1.;
(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, nevertheleii.
since it was employed in an industrial use, il \la'
not subject to either the Utah sales or use tax.
since the Utah Sales Tax Act exempts ~ales of r·o<ii
for industrial uses.

1

•"rhus, the exemption of coal for indu:;tna!
use seems to have a similar basis as the exempt\11
of wholesale sales; that is, the tax will be f•ollecfr !
later on the finished product. However, actna'
incorporation of the coal into the manufarturid
product is not a requirement to qualif~' for tL·
industrial exemption.
"This rationale also provides a rpasonah!·
hasis for the holding in thP recent casP of 0111!'
Union R.R. Depot Co. v. 8tatr Tn.r Co111111 1s1•111 '
11

1

u; l 1tah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57, modified on rehearing
Utah 2d ______ , 399 P.2d 145 (1964). There,
('nal was purchased in -Wyoming and used in Utah
in the plaintiff's business of repairing railroad
t•qniprnent. The coal was not used to manufacture
a product which subsequently was going to be
:-;nhjeet to the Utah sales tax. 'fhe Court held that
:-:neh a use was commercial and, therefore, taxable.
"A further gl1ide is provided in the case of
lT'isco11sin Electric Pou·rr Co. v. United States,
:i31; l ~.N. 1'/G ( 1948). There, the Court said that in
<lderrn ining wheth<:>r a business is industrial or
('OHm1ercial, one must look at the "predominant
drnrader" of th<:> business.
"l t appears that the question of this opinion
lllUst he answ<:>red b~, applying the definitions and
guide sugg<:>sted above, together with the purpose
for tJrn cornrn<:>rcial-industrial distinction as disr·nsse<l. In so doing, it is believed that the predominant character of the railroad business is
(·onnnercial in nature; that is, it does not involve
manufacturing or fabrication. The fact that th<:>
hn;.;iness of the railroad does not consist in that
t:-pP of activity upon which a Utah sales tax is
P\'Pntnally levied would, in view of the intention
of the PXemption, also classify the sale of coal, etc.,
to railroads as commercial. Since the application
of Hw factors discussed herein leads to the con<'111sion that th<:> sale of coal is for a commt'rcial
nsP, s1wh a sal<:> is subjt'ct to the Utah sales tax.

R<:>spectfully submitted,
( s) PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General Phil L. Hansen"
PLH/jbr./bv

G/2:1/fi5
m. 7. s. 23, 24-26)
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In accordance with and based on said Opinion, rJ,
fendant jssued a sales and use tax bulletin containin'
a notification that effective July 1, 19G5, all t-:ales ,1;
gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil and other fueb Kolil
to rajlroads would be considered subject to the sales tax.
and all storage, use or other consumption of such itP111 ,
in Utah by railroads in connection with out-of-state purchases, would be subject to the use tax. (R. 8, 27)
Upon receipt of said notice plaintiff advised defendant that in its view the Attorney General's Opinion ami
the position of the State Tax Commission pursuant there
to was in error, and that said sales and use in Utal1
were exempt from the sales and use tax laws. Plaintiff
also indicated that the validity of the Opinion would lie
contested. To do so plaintiff presented to defendant the
factual data on three out-of-state purhases of locomotive
fuel oil which occurred in July of 1965. Two of the pm
chases came from Sinclair, Wyoming, and one came from
Denver, Colorado. All three were delivered to Union
Pacific's storage facilities at Ogden, Utah, and thereafter
used by it for propulsion of locomotives in the operation
of its railroad, including switch engines and road engim;,
both in passenger and in freight service. (R. 8, 9)
Following receipt of the information concerning sa 11l
out-of-state purchases totaling $25,383.23 defendant ifsued and served a deficiency use tax assessment npuu
plaintiff for the period July, 1965, and assessed a use tai
against plaintiff in the sum of $888.42 on said ont-of-$ta!i
purchases. The "remarks'' section of the deficiency :F
sessment states:

9

"rrl1is audit assesses Utah use tax on purchases of locomotive fuel oil listed on Exhibit A-1,
and is assessed in accordance with Attorney Gent•ral's Opinion 65-038 that sales of energy and fuel
oil to railroads are subject to tax." ( R. 9)
The factual details of said purchases by plaintiff
and the subsequent use thereof in its railroad business
am rl'presentative of a general practice by plaintiff
1rliich has been in existence for over 20 years. Plaintiff
ltas also made similar purchases of fuel oil within the
~tnt(' of Utah for the same type use over the same period.
Said purd1ases as outlined represent only a small percentage of the overall purchases, use and consumption
nf fuel by plaintiff in Utah for the propoulsion of locou10tives transporting persons and property in the operation of its railroad business. All other railroads in
bu8iness in Ftah have similar operations with respect to
tltr purchase, storage, use and consumption of locomotive
fud oil, and have paid no sales or use taxes to the State
of Utah on the same. (R. 10)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Tl-m Ll~GISLATURE INTENDED TO EXEJ;\f PT THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY FROM
SALES AND USE TAX ON THE PURCHASE AND CONSFMPTION OF FUEiL· OIL
F'OR rr1rn~ PROPULSION OF LOCOMO'I'fYES, AND THE TAX COMMISSION'S
LONO-STANDlNG ADMINISTRATIVE RECOG:NITION THEREOF HAS BEEN ENTIRELY PROPER.
1'axability in this case is dependent upon the conto he placed upon the provisions of Section 59-

~trurtion
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15-4(a), UCA, 1953, as amended, which ::,;pecifically l'i
empts the sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels from tJ 1"
tax, except as provided in subsection (b) wherp a sa!~,
tax is imposed upon "gas, electricity, heat,, coal, fuel oll
or other fuels sold or furnished for domestic or connnetcial consumption."
The basic judicial approach for proper statutnn
construction is to carry out what the legislature had in
mind at the time of the enactment. That principlP wa'
recently applied in Johnson vs. State Tax Commission,
17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d. 831 (Utah, 1966), where thi~.
court observed:
"The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in regard to the interpretation
and application of a statute is: What was the
intent of the legislature~ All of the rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it and an
helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining
that objective. In determining that intent the
statute should be considered in the light of the pmpose it was designed to serve and so applied as to
carry out that purpose if that can be done consistent with its language.''
In the application of that fundamental principle to
the present case we are fortunate in having a legislativ1•
history which is explicitly clear in establishing legislative
intent without the need for the court to rely npon pen
pheral rules of statutory construction. That legislative
history graphically illustrates, as we will hereinaftN
point out, that the lawmakers intended to exempt railroads from the sales and use tax on locomotive fuel oil.
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Th<:' Pxemption for noncommercial consumption of
,·oal, fuel oil and other fuels was first added to the Utah
::ialPs tax act by chapter 93, Laws of Utah, 1943, effective

March 18, 1943. However, the basic statutory exemption
from the 8alt's tax for noncommercical consumption was
a .part of the original Emergency Revenue Act of 1933.
(H. 14) Aecordingly, to acquire the complete legislative
history as well as the administration of said exemption
h)' tlH' State Tax Commission, it is necessary to review
certain material events which go back to the early 1930's.
Tlw origin of the present statutory provision conterning dome8tic and commercial consumption in the Sales
Tax Ad is found in Section 4 (b) of Chapter 63, Laws of
L'tah, 1933, commonly known as the Emergency Revenue
"1r·t of 1933. That section provided that "all services rendered or commodities furnished for domestic or commer<'ial consumption by any utility of the State of Utah,"
1rhirh was under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities
Commission, were subject to the sales tax. (R.14)

Effrctive August 3, 1933, the Second Special Session
uf the legi8lature amended Section 4(b) to provide that
tlw sales tax would apply only "to gas, electric and heat
eorporation8 * * * for gas, electricity, or heat, furnished
for dompstic or commercial consumption.'' (R. 15, 16)
'l'he 1933 legislature obtained the basic language for
f-lPetion +( h) from a similar provision which was then contain('d in Section 616(a) of the Federal Revenue Act
of 19:12. In addition, and of material significance in the
presPnt case, the Utah legislature adopted the federal
ler;i~lativP hi8tory of said provision as well as the federal
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regulations promulgated with respect thereto. ln fatt I
said history and regulations, along with Section 616(a),
provided both the source and the background for Section
4 ( b) of Chapter 63, Laws of Utah, 1933, as well as thi
regulations of the Tax Commission pertaining thereto.
(R. 13, 14)
Section 616 (a) as originally enacted on June 6, 19:J~,
by the 72nd Congress, imposed a tax "for electrical energy
for domestic or commercial consumption * * *." On
June 16, 1933, the 73rd Congress amended the section
to shift the tax from the consumer to the vendor. (R. lU,
11)
The original provision was first proposed as a Senate amendment to the Revenue Act of 1932 in the fol1011ing language :
"There is hereby imposed upon energy sold by
privately owned operating electrical power companies a tax equivalent to 3 per cent of the price
for which so sold.'' 72 Congressional Record, page
12054. (R. 11)
The amendment was ref erred to a Conferrncr Cmnmittee, which reported:
" . . . This amendment imposes a tax of 3 Jltl
cent of the sale price of electrical energy sold hY
privately owned, operating electrical power com:
panies. The House recedes with an a111ernh11t·H',
substituting a tax of 3 per cent of the prire paJU
for electrical energy for domestic or comrnereinl
use (as distinguished from industrial use), to lw
paid by the purchaser and collected by the ven~or
. . . " H. R. (Conf. Report) No. 1492, 72nd (on
gress, 1st Session, page 22. (R. 11)
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'rile Confon•nce Heport was accepted. 72 Congres,,i(mal l{p(•ord, page 12071. (R. 12)

On May 11, 1933, the Senate debated and discussed
the proposed amendment to Section 616 (a) to shift the
tax from the consumer to the vendor. The material comments are set out in Volume 77, Congressional Record,
Letwccn pages 3212 and 3217 :
Senator Harrison, a member of the Senate Finance
Committee, which favorably reported the Revenue Act,
iu dis(·rn.;8sing the proposed revision in 1933, said:
" ... I am tellling the Senators nothing new
when I remind them that we had a fight here in
1932 over the imposition of this tax. The Senate
imposed a 3 per cent electric-energy tax, and it
was finally adopted, to be collected from the consumer of electrical energy. We applied that only
nn domestic and commercial energy; that is, electric ent>rgy used in stores and dwellings that are
elassified as commercial and domestic. There was
no tax in the 1932 Act imposed upon energy employpd in industry."

Mr. Robinson of Indiana: "I am asking the Senator
Dir. Harrison) for information because I know he is
\°('l'Y familiar with the subject. I have had a number of
'inquiri<>s with reference to a 1 per cent tax assessed
ct~ain~t electric railways. Does the Senator call that inrln,trial enn·gy ?"

~1.''

1fr. Hanison: "Yes, I think that is industrial enerrn. 11, 12)
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This excerpt clearly indicates that Congress intPllf]
the railroad industry to qualify as an exempted indu 8tn:ii
user.

.,•
1

Further evidence showing that the Senate intPnrled
the railroad industry to be exempt from the tax impoReil
on commercial consumption under Section 61() (a),"
shown by the proposal at page 3216 (which wa8 not
adopted) to include a proviso "that this tax shall nu'
apply to the sale of electric energy sold for manufactur.
ing purposes."
In arguing against the amendment, at page :l2E.
Senator Reed said:
"Furthermore, the Senator's amendment wo11lii
exempt manufacturing concerns if they buy indu.'
trial current but does not exempt the trolle.1
lines which are now in receivership or on tlw verg
of it. The Senator from Nebraska does not exernpt
railroad companies which are having a bad tiuw
now. Many manufacturing concerns are far hPt!Pt
able to pay the 3 per cent tax than are the railroad
companies and the trolley lines which will finrl
themselves taxed under it. It is a wholly unju,i
discrimination." (R. 12)

1
•

The federal regulation applicable to 616(a), whid
was promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Ren
nue in 1932, and again in 1933 following the amendment
to Section 616 (a), -is even more explicit. It provided ii

1

part:
"Scope of tax. The tax is imposed u1 10:.
electrical energy sold for domestic or eomroer<'1•;
consumption and not for resale, except as pro\1'
ed hereinafter.
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'''l'he term 'electrical energy sold for domestic or commercial consumption' does not in<' 1ude ( 1) electrical energy sold for industrial
consumption, e.g., for use in manufacturing,
processing, mining, refining, shipbuilding, building construction, irrigation. etc., or (2) that sold
for other uses which likewise can not be classed
as domestic or commercial, such as the electrical
t>nergy used by public utilities, waterworks, telegraph, telephone and radio communication companies, railroads, other common carriers, educational institutions not operated for profit,
rhmches, and charitable institutions. However,
electrical energy is subject to tax if sold for use
in commercial phases of industrial or other businesses, such as in office buildings, sales and display rooms, retail stores, etc." Emphasis added.
(R. 13)
Hecognizing the intent of the Utah legislature in its
enactment of ~<:>ction ±(b) of the Emergency Revenue
Ad of 19:l:3, and following the basic language of the foregoing federal regulation, the State Tax Commission is'ned its regulation on the effective date of the Emergency
Revenu(o Act with respect to the scope of domestic and
r·onuuercial <'onsmnption. Said regulation provided in
part, as follows:
"All services rendered or commodities furnished the consumer by a utility are taxable, exrrpt:
"(1) Services rendered or commodities furHisl1ed for industrial consumption, e.g., those used
in lllanufacturing, processing, mining, refining,
building construction, etc., and

11 hose rendered or furnished for other
1ises which likewise cannot he classed as domestic
"(~)
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or commercial, such as public utilities, watenl'oit
irrigation companies, telegraph, telephonl:' uni'
radio communication companies, railroad!), 'r,t]i, 1
common carriers, educational institution~ 1111
operated for profit, churches and charitabk· in 1t
tutions." Emphasis added. (R. 15)
1

No change of any significance occurred in said regn
lation until July 1, 19·±-±, and no change was made in (Ji,
statute until 1\Iarch 18, 19±3. Of course, during that Pntiie
period the railroad industry was exempted from tlw ~aJ,,
tax on amounts paid for gas, electricity and heat.
The effect of the exemption afforded users of ga,,
electricity and heat furnished for other than dom('st1
or commercial consumption placed producers of, dea!Pr,
in, and consumers of coal, fuel oil and other fm•ls at a
competitive disadvantage. (R. 17) Accordingl~', th(' 19-l:!
legislature enacted Chapter 93, effective l\Iareh 18, l~H
again amending Section 4 of the Emergency Revenue Act
of 1933. The amendment expanded the exemption fn:
noncommercial consumption to include "coal, fupl oii
and other fuels." (R. 18).
1

Chapter 93 was introduced as Senate Bill 17~ awl
was prepared by the State Tax Commission. It was spon
sored by legislators who were residents of coal-produ('iu~
areas for the purpose of removing the diseriminali
which had resulted to Utah coal producers, fuel oil ]lfi'
ducers and other fuel producers from an imposition of a
tax on sales of such products for other than domestic 11
1
commercial consumption. In its consideration and 1'' •
actment of Chapter 93 the legislature had before it awi
relied u1wn the prior construction of the phrase "clon 1"
1111
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tic and eo11miereial eonsumption" from the original Emer".''ll".\' H('V('nUP Act, together with the Tax Commission's
n'gnlatiorn; applicable thereto. (R. 19). This had the
!'radical pffoet of exempting the railroad industry from
the tax on coal, fuel oil and other fuels to the same extent
and in th<~ same manner as had been the case with gas,
eledricit)' and heat from the effective date of the Emeri-'.('Dl'Y Hov(•nue Act of 1933.

Jn fact, immediately following the enactment of Chapt~r 9:J, the Commission advised vendors and purchasers
of cmtl, fuel oil and other fuels that the purchase and
m;e th('n'of for the propulsion of locomotives in the op''ration of a railroad was not a use for domestic or com1111"n·ial consumption and that said use was exempt from
!he tax. (R 19)
Sinee the enactment of Chapter 93, there has been
110 material change in the statutory language of Section
-1( lJ) of tltP Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, as amended,
\\'ith res]J<:>ct to the legislative exemption for gas, electrir·it)', heat, eoal, fuel oil or other fuels furnished for
11
thPr than domestic or commercial consumption. The
Jl 1h<'nt provision is Section 59-15--1-, Utah Code Anno~~11·d, Hl5:~, as amended. (R. 22)
Newrtlteless, there was a brief reversal in the adtuini8trative handling of the exemption with respect to
t\ip railroad industrv by the Tax Commission shortly
al'ter Chapter 93 became effective. It began on January 1,
::1-1~. mth a revision of the regulation relating to the
'1d'inition of commercial use. The revised regulation
Jirii\ idPd in part:
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"Commercial use means the use conm~t,. 1
with trade or commerce, or a use used in the cr 111 •
mercial phases of industrial or other businPK.'r,
For example, thP use of Plertricity to light a n•tai
store is a commercial use and the use of eh·drieit'
to light the administrative offices of an indu~t1iir:
concern is in the nature of a commercial U~t>. Tlr'
tax upon gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, 01
other fuels applies only to the sale or furni~hi11~
of such services for domestic or commercial f'rJll
surnption. \Vhere the consumer has all ga~. Plw
tricity or heat used at a given location fnrni.,lir·r
through one meter, the predominant character nl
the business carried on at such location shall i\1
termine the classification of the consumption ril
~mch product for the purpose;,; of the Act." (R. ;i;i
On .January 10, 1944, thP Commission isstwd arr
order advising vendors and vendees of gas, elPdriei\.1
heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels of its opinion that t\1"
use of such materials or pnergy for the JJUrpose of haul
ing freight or passengers by railroad was a comnwrern
consumption and therefore taxable under Chapter 93. T\1,
Commission further advised that the sale of such enef,!."
and fuel from and after January 15, 19+.t, wonlrl Ii
subject to the imposition of the tax. (R. 20)

1

Between January 15, 1944, and February 29, 10-H
'rhe Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Cornpan
(hereinafter called Rio Grande) purchased from Ftal
Fuel Company a quantity of coal which was ns<'<l anr!
consumed primarily for the propulsion of locomoti1
used by the Rio Grande in the operation of its railroarl
The Commission denied the Rio Grande's claiuwd
emption from the sales tax for such use and consumptior
based upon its order of January 10, 1944, and Rio Grm111
1
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\t'<l a pdition before the Commission alleging that such
,,Ji(•c. of coal wen-• fully exempt on the grounds that said
1 oal 11 as not sold or furnished for domestic or commercial
l'OJl~\llll]JtiOn. (R. 21)
11

Following a hearing on said petition, the Tax Comu1i~sion h.v a formal decision dismissed the case on No1·pm]wr 7, 1945, expressly recognizing therein that the use
and <·onsumvtion of coal for the propulsion of Rio
Grande 's locomotives was not a commercial consumption
11ithin the proper scope and meaning of Chapter 93.
:H. 21)
ln addition, the Tax Commission issued a Bulletin
on October 19, 1945, revoking its order of January 10,
l9+-1-, and readopting the construction and practice the
Commission had followed from the enactment of the
J~mergency Revenue Act in 1933 to 1943, to the effect that
'uch USP and consumption by railroads did not constitute
cmnmrrrial use and the sale or furnishing of such items
tu railroads was not taxable. (R. 21)
1'111· regulation defining commercial use issued on
.Jairnar>· 1, 194+, has never been altered by the Tax Com1uis0ion to the present date even though at least eight
additional r!:'visions of the sales and use tax regulations
liurp oernrred since that time. And, since the formal
111
' ing of the Commission in the Rio Grande case and
:1i,. 1 ~~nanee of the Tax Commission's Bulletin on OctoJ,"1 1 'J, 10-1-5, there has been no effort or attempt on the
1iait or the Commission to impose a sales or use ta.x on
:Jt,. eii11snmption of coal, fuel oil or other fuels in loco-
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motives, and the Tax Conunission has recognized th(',.,
emption of such use and consumption during that ent1 1,
period of time and until July 1, 1965. The chang
and reversal of position by the Commission was dnf' tr
Opinion No. 65-038 of the Attorney General. (R. 2:1)

1

vVe believe the foregoing outline of the legislafo,
history of Section 4(b) persuasively establishe8 the in
tention of the legislature and that further argument will!
respect thereto ·would be superfluous. H is abundanth
clear that the lawmakers intended to exclude and exPlllJll
the railroad industry from the sales and u:::;e tax on tl1c
purchase, storage and consumption of locomotive hwl
oil. We now ask this court to enforce that intent.
In addition, we have pre:::;ented the eontemporaneon·
and administrative construction given the statutory Ian
guage by the Tax Commission which has been in comple1
harmony with the legislative history, with one brief inli'1
lude, for a long period of tirne. Such construction a1l1
practice by the Tax Commission is entitled to recel1 1
great weight before the court. See State vs. Hatch, 9rtali
2d 288, 34-2 P.2d 1103 (1959), and UndercoflPr v. East r
Airlines, Inc., 147 SE 2d 436 (Ga., 1966).
1

1 1

POINT II
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION NO. 65038 IS ERRONEOUS AND SHOTTLD BE DISCARDED.
Although this appeal is for the purpose of reviewlnr
the majority decision of the Tax Commission upholrlin;
· · n an'1·
the deficiency use tax assessment, :•rince t h e d ee1s10
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tl11· a:;s(•:;smcnt are both predicated upon Attorney Gen1.ral'c: Opinion No. 65-038, we will proceed to an exami1w(io11 of its validity.

Jn the light of the established legislative intent with
to the statute imposing a ta-\: for energy and fuel
":;old or furnished for domestic or commercial consumption,'' the misconceptions in and fallacious conclusion of
Opinion No. G5-038 become readily apparent. In fact only
a C'msory examination reveals its vulnerability.
re~pert

Ac{·ording to that Opinion, the law in Utah on the
of whether or not sales of energy and fuel to
rnilroads is taxable under Section 59-15-4 is dependent
u1JOn thP applieation of three factors or guides:

r1nP~tion

Tlw fin;t factor is to apply the definitions of "com111neial" and "industrial." However, in establishing their
11waning, the Opinion indiscriminately looks to all cases
nn any subject matter where one or both of these terms
liayp been involved. ·while conceding that the cases are
not easil~, s)·nthesized, the Opinion does arrive at what it
l':tll~ "a J11Paningful distinction" which ''has been made
Ill 'UlllP eases which say that fuel would be used commerl'iall~· \I lien m;ed merely to assist in the exchange of goods
and ::wrvicPs * * * and industrially when used to manufacture or fabricate materials." In making this distinction
iltp Opinion ignores the only case where both terms are
''' 11 'l(k•recl in connection with railway transportation.
Ill Slate cs. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W. 2d 513 (1938),
a .\[i,s()uri statute taxed all sales of electricity to "do1'hAi<', <·ornrnercial and industrial consumers" of electric
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current. An effort was made to impose the tax on t[1,
current used by a street railway in propelling street
rail cars. The court held that transportation of passen
gers on street railway cars was neither commercial nor
industrial and points out that several Public Senici·
Commissions as well as the Federal Power Commissiou
have classified the various users of electricity into si.1
categories: domestic, commercial, industrial, sale of ~lee
tricity to railroads, municipalities, and to other utilitie.'
for resale.
\Ve agree that the definitions selected by the Attor
ney General can be found in some cases. But at the sam1·
time, it is apparent that by their nature both ternrn ta11
be construed in innumerable ways, and differences ot
opinion as to their meaning can and often do occur. b
other words we are dealing with language whirh i·
susceptible to ambiguity and uncertainty. Therein, \1'
think, lies the fallacy of the abstract technique employeo
in the Attorney General's Opinion. The scatter-gun a11
1

proach in defining an ambiguous word in a statute run;
the substantial risk of employing the wrong definitio11
as exemplified by this Opinion.
Rather than guess at the legislative intent, refern1t"
should have been made to the language of the statut1
the subject matter of the Act, its legislative history, a111 •
•
1·
any other acceptable aid to statutory construction. ~·
C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 351, Norville vs. State Tax C0111 1111 •
sion, 98Utah170, 97 P.2d 937 (1940).
.

- . .

,j'.

In this regard, and in contrast to said Opm1on, ·
believe a proper approach in arriving at tlw corr
1
'
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(Hinitions of commercial and industrial in this case was
taken by Conunissioner Gunther in his dissenting opinion
to the Tax Commission's Decision. He cogently points out
that the tax imposed by subsection (b) of 59-15--± on fuels
i:- n0t a tax of gt>neral imposition, but actually is one of
Ji111iti>cl imposition because of the general undefined tax
1•xPmption for such fuels in subsection (a). (R. 72) In
1Jtlti·r 1rnrds the legislature intended to exempt every
transaction relating to fuels unless specifically qualifying
within the limited area to be taxed. This requires a strict
('onstrndion of the word "commercial,'' since it is in the
area to be taxed, and a broad construction must be appJjed to the word "industrial," which would include the
rnilroad industry, since it is in the generally undefined
l'Wmpted area.
Jn addition, in the present case the complete legislati\'e history of the Utah statute was and is available and
"XJH'eRsly Pxeluded the railroad industry from the scope
(Jf "eonnnereial" consumption. It is apparent from examining the Attorney General's Opinion that no attempt
' 1 a~ lllade to d(~fine the material terms involved by looking to the context of their use in the statute or in the
if'gislative history.
This iR graphically illustrated on page 3 of the Opini"n (R. 2()) where the application of the abstract definition of "industrial" produces a final result in direct violation of the manifest legislative intent. It states: "* * *
ii 1' beliPved that the predominant character of the rail1110il lmsineRR it-> connnereial in nature; that is, it does
11 1
'' inyo]w manufacturing or fabrication." However, as
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we have heretofore pointed out in Point I, for the expre,,
purpose of preventing industrial consumption to be 1,.
stricted and limited to manufacturing, the Senate in 19:1:
defeated a proposed proviso to 616 (a) that the tax woulri
"not apply to the sale of electric energy sold for mauu
facturing purposes." (R. 12)
The second factor applied by the Opinion is base1i
upon the unfounded presumption that the basic distiiic
tion between commercial and industrial consumption 1,
dependent upon whether or not the consumption of tlw
energy or fuel constitutes the last opportunity to im]M'
the tax. If it is, the use is commercial; if it is not, usini
the analogy of a wholesale sale, the use is industrial be
cause the tax will be collected later on the cost of tl1
finished product.

1

Such a distinction, if in fact it is a distinction, doP>
not appear at any place in the legislative history of tl1e
Sales Tax Act, and until this Opinion, has never beeD
the basis for the administration and construction of tlJ1
statute by the State Tax Commission. The proper le>1
of what is commercial and what is industrial has allra:
been tied to the nature of the business making the llf',
rather than whether or not a tax can ultimately ))(' iw
posed on an article associated with the consumption Thi·
was made clear by the opinion of the Supreme Cour
of the United States in Wisconsin Power Company 1'
United States, 336 U.S. 176 (1945). In construing !]ii
scope of the term "commercial'~ under Section GlG (a
11
which was the forerunner and source of the present H
statute, the Court states:
0
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"'l1 he legislative history indicates that the
tPrnl 'commercial' was meant to apply to the natnt<' of the business in which the energy is con~;urned. . . .''

ln 11fa cfo;senting op1mon, Commissioner Gunther
further exposes the error of the alleged wholesale sales
analogy as the basis for determining what constitutes
i11dn.-:trial use by pointing out some inconsistent results
tl11ough its application.
At pages 74 and 75 of the Record, he states:
"An adoption of the tests suggested in the
Attorney General's opinion, while it might in many
situations produce equitable results, can in some
!Pad to l!Uestionable conclusions and, more significantly, tends to make indistinct and meaningless
the difference between 'industrial' consumption and
'c·ommercial' consumption of these fuels. For example, application of these tests to sales of fuel
to a commercial repair garage and to the United
8tatPs Steel plant at Geneva points out some of
tl1l•se problems. United States Steel, manufacturing tangible products for resale, is clearly an inrlnstrial consumer under the opinion and would be
<'XPlllpt from tax on its fuel purchases. This is
1l'UP PV('n though its sales are out of the state as
a w·neral rule and promise no later tax receipts
in (•x:rhange for the exemption.
"At the same time, Opinion No. 65-038 would

in1 pose a tax on the purchase of fuel by a com-

lllr>rcial repair garage because no tangible product
rP1<11lts from such production. But the end product
of the garage, i.e., service, is taxable under the
l"tah Salrs Tax Act. Therefore, even though the
fw•I W<>re put to the same use in both cases, such
n::; thP propulsion of vehicles belonging to the re-
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spective establishments or to the produdion "
heat, nevertheless, the commercial establi~Ji 1111 • 1 .
would pay a dual tax in this state and the inrlu:.
trial establishment would likely pay no tax at nl!
It is submitted, therefore, that the funda111 .. nlr1 '
premise of the opinion is in error."
Opinion No. 65-038 states that the third or fi11a
factor to be applied in determining whether a hu8ilH~·
is industrial or commercial is to look at its ''pn·domirnu11
character," citing the Wisconsin Power Co. case, 8upr::.
\Ve have no quarrel with the application of that prinri11l1
to the present case, because it has always been an am111
ed doctrine under both the federal and state tax pr11
visions involving commercial consumption, and has lwt1
expressly recognized in all regulations promulgat~i
thereunder, including Regulation No. 35, presently !1
effect. However, we do object to the misapplication 01
that principle in this case. The Opinion concludes !ha
the predominant character of the railroad businesf i
commercial because it does not involve manufacturing
fabrication. This is simply a negative application of t1,
Opinion's incorrect and limited definition of "industria:·
in an attempt to place railroads in the "commercial'
category, while ignoring the factor of "prPdominant c1111:
acter" altogether.
111

It was admitted by the stipulation of facts, and sPelll
obvious, that the predominant character of plaintiff's hn'
ness is the transportation of persons and property by rw
In the present case, since the consumption of fuel oil fn:
the propulsion of locomotives is the very essence of r:i1
roading, there is no question that such consumption•·
·r·1
associated with the "predominant character" of plaint1t
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fiu-:i11<•c:c;. And, m; we have already pointed out in Point
1, ,;ud1 buc:iness was intended by the legislature to be
i•\f'liipt from the tax on its consumption of energy and
fuel because of its predominantly noncommercial character.
Nevertheless, there are some minor phases of activity
thP railroad industry, as in other industrial enterpm:P~, which may properly qualify as commercial in
nature and be subject to the sales tax. That situation
hn~ fJPen recognized in both federal and state regulations
.'incr• the original tax enactments in 1932 and 1933. For
~xample the first federal regulation provided in part:
m

". . . However, electrical energy is subject to

tax if sold for use in commerccial phases of in-

dm;trial or other businesses, such as office buildings, sales and display rooms, retail stores, etc."

m. 13)

Both the i11itial state regulations concerning comeonsmnption and the present regulation contain
~imilar language.

111Prcial

P'rorn our analysis, it appears that the ruling of this

·01ut in Tlie Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company

1

State Tu.1 Commission, 16 Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145
il06:i), on rehearing, could properly qualify as an exeilllple of' the application of the tax to a minor corrunercial
i'lta~P of an industrial enterprise. However, we also rec,,~nir,<· that the facts of that case are at material variance
ith tlw ]iresPnt one. There is a wide difference between
1 1
' lJ,'l1111ption
of fuel in the propulsion of locomotives
111 11
1l • operation of a railroad, including switch engines
1

'·

and road pngines in moving pas::wngers and freight, ano
consumption of coal by a separate and distinct terminal
company in a stationary pmvt~r plant for tlw purpoRe o!
applying heat for various terminal activities.

CONCLUSION
'Ve believe the legislative intention to exempt th~
railroad industry in Utah from the sales and us~ tax
on its consumption of fuel oil for the propulsion of loco.
motives is clearly established. We therefore urge the
court to enforce that intent by reversing the majority
decision of the Tax Commission.
Respectfully submitted,
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